Where Two Worlds Meet:  A Time for Reassessment in the Anthropology of Law by Roberts, Simon
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 4 
1981 
Where Two Worlds Meet: A Time for Reassessment in the 
Anthropology of Law 
Simon Roberts 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Simon Roberts, Where Two Worlds Meet: A Time for Reassessment in the Anthropology of Law, 79 MICH. 
L. REV. 737 (1981). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol79/iss4/14 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
WHERE TWO WORLDS MEET: A TIME FOR 
REASSESSMENT IN THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 
Simon Roberts* 
DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPEC-
TIVE. By P.H. Gulliver. New York: Academic Press. 1979. Pp. xxii, 
293. $19. 
THE DISPUTING PROCESS - LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES. Edited by 
Laura Nader and Harry F. Todd Jr. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press. 1978. Pp. xx, 372. Cloth $28.10; paper $12.50. 
THE IMPOSITION OF LA w. Edited by Sandra B. Burman and Bar-
bara E. Harrell-Bond. New York: Academic Press. 1979. Pp. xiv, 
324. $22. 
The past couple of decades have seen a notable increase in writ-
ings on the anthropology oflaw. What was at the end of the 1950s a 
rather small, select literature1 concerned mainly with stateless groups 
has become a teeming industry directed at problems across the whole 
field of social order. By any reckoning, P.H. Gulliver and Laura 
Nader have made very important contributions to this development, 
both in terms of their own work and through what they have stimu-
lated others to do. For that reason alone, their most recent books 
offer a good moment to reflect on the subject as a whole. Beyond 
that, both works represent the culmination of major projects in 
which their authors had long been engaged, and thus have a flavor of 
the summing up, the accounting. The feeling that a watershed has 
been reached is reinforced if one looks at the contemporary litera-
ture of legal anthropology as a whole: established techniques -
often those pioneered by Gulliver and Nader- are repeated in nu-
• Senior Lecturer in Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. LL.B. 
1962, Ph.D. 1968, London School of Economics; Adviser on Customary Law to the Govern-
ment of Botswana, 1968-1971. 
I. The books which stand out from this earlier period are relatively few: B. MALINOWSKI, 
CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY {1926); I. SCHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA 
LAW AND CUSTOM (1938); K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); M. 
GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955); 
V. TURNER, SCHISM AND CONTINUITY IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY (1957); P. BOHANNAN, Jus-
TICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIV (1957). 
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merous ethnographies. There is some evidence, in both books, that 
this watershed is no more than a pause for breath and that both au-
thors will be off in new directions shortly. Meanwhile, what has 
been achieved, and what should come next? 
Two features of Gulliver's work are representative of general ad-
vances noticeable in the best "legal" ethnographies published since 
1960. First, the case histories relied on in Social Control in an African 
Society (1963), and in Neighbours and Networks (1971), offer a far 
greater depth of detail than previous scholars managed to achieve.2 
Second, Gulliver carefully fills in the socio-cultural background to 
provide a proper context within which the observed dispute 
processes can be understood. 
Alongside these general advances, three crucial departures from 
the pre-1960s literature are visible in Gulliver's writing. First, the 
strong "transactional" flavor marks a sharp contrast with earlier 
rule-centered studies like those of Isaac Schapera, Max Gluckman, 
and Paul Bohannan.3 Here we are no longer confined to discussion 
of rules and exposition of structure, but are confronted with the ac-
tivities of living men; we cannot but admire the way in which Gul-
liver leads us through the successes and failures of Ndendeuli 
"notables" as they attempt to manage the settlement process. His 
work thus represents a shift from a "normative" to an "interpretive" 
paradigm. Second, there is Gulliver's effort to introduce greater 
rigor and analytical clarity into the study of different forms of pro-
cess. In doing so he breaks with the tradition of viewing third-party 
intervention in disputes as entirely adjudicatory in character. In An-
cient Law (1861) and subsequent writings, Sir Henry Maine postu-
lated a great leap from fighting to adjudication with the onset of 
social life. From the senior male agnate right through to the Victo-
rian high court judge he saw the mode of decision-making as one of 
third-party adjudication;4 the only difference was that, as successive 
stages of civilization were reached, different kinds of people did the 
'judging" and different criteria underpinned their judgments. Un-
derlying this view is the idea, stretching far back in political theory,S 
2. An exception must be made in respect of the case histories in Turner's Schism 011d Co11• 
ti11uity ill 011 Aftica11 Society (1957). 
3. See note I supra. 
4. In brief asides in both ANCIENT LAW 220 (1861) and DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW 
AND CusTOM 170 (1883), Maine hints at adjudicatory processes being preceded by processes of 
arbitration; but this suggested sequence is not elaborated. 
5. At least to T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651). The same position was shared by J. AUSTIN, 
THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832), and, perhaps surprisingly, by J. BEN-
THAM, A11archical Fallacies, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 500-01 (J. Bowring ed. 
1843). 
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that order is conceivable only if there are strong men in positions of 
authority ready to tell others what to do. This position was still held 
by some anthropologists as late as the 1950s, 6 and came under sys-
tematic attack only after Gulliver formulated a typology of "struc-
turally different modes" of dispute settlement which distinguished 
negotiation from adjudication. His interest in this problem, which 
first appears in Social Control in an African Society (1963) and con-
tinues in his subsequent work, is taken still further in the book under 
review. These efforts have greatly influenced other scholars, and 
mark the starting point of a considerable literature. Third, there is 
Gulliver's work in the area of "pluralism." While earlier studies had 
to some extent explored the problems inherent in the co-existence of 
parallel dispute settlement institutions within a single "law district,"7 
Gulliver broke new ground in focusing upon the selective use of ad-
jacent settlement institutions by disputants. In the Arusha study, he 
explored the circumstances under which disputants might resort to 
procedures located in lineage, age-set, and parish, as well as in local 
agencies of the national administration. 
Disputes and Negotiations pushes forward the second of these 
three areas of Gulliver's interest by reassessing, expanding, and con-
cluding his earlier work on negotiatory modes of dispute settlement. 
This work began with his field-studies of settlement processes in 
some East African societies. His efforts to generalize then led him to 
the studies by social scientists of similar questions in Western socie-
ties, and to a specific focus on industrial negotiations. His concern is 
thus deliberately cross-cultural: "to show that patterns of interactive 
behaviour in negotiations are essentially similar despite marked dif-
ferences in interests, ideas, values, rules, and assumptions among 
negotiators in different societies" (p. xv). The outline of much of 
what he writes is familiar from previous publications; but at almost 
every point there are important modifications of earlier positions. 
Particularly in chapters four and five, where he lays out what he de-
scribes as his "processual models of negotiation," much is entirely 
fresh. As in Gulliver's earlier work, the strength lies in his robustly 
empirical approach, and in his stated reluctance to invoke theory 
where it cannot be grounded in, or related to, his data. For those 
already familiar with his earlier writing, the most interesting aspect 
of this book surely will be his tantalizingly brief concluding remarks 
6. See, e.g., L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS AND THEIR LAW (1958). 
7. See, e.g., id. Among the problems of this type are those associated with the clash of 
indigenous institutions and agencies of central government in the colonial context. 
740 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:737 
about future directions which the study of negotiation might take. I 
return to these later. 
* * * * 
Nader's contribution to the anthropology of law has taken quite 
different forms. While she has published some important ethno-
graphic studies,8 much of her most valuable work consists of the un-
selfish but essential tasks of drawing together and rationalizing the 
writings of legal anthropology, and of coordinating large-scale re-
search projects. In three major surveys of the literature,9 she has 
identified issues she saw as central and directions that future work 
might valuably take. One theme she has returned to repeatedly is 
the use of anthropological :findings and methods in the study of con-
temporary Western societies. It is much too early to assess just how 
influential these efforts will be, for this is presently a rapidly expand-
ing field. Equally notable have been her efforts to reach people in 
other disciplines (especially lawyers) through seminars and confer-
ences, as well as through her writing. Nader's major achievement, 
however, must be the Berkeley Village Law Project, the successful 
completion of which is documented in her latest book, The .Disputing 
Process. 
This ambitious project involved sending out graduate students 
over a ten-year period (1965-1975) to study disputes in a wide variety 
of societies. Fourteen students went into the field: two in Asia; four 
to Europe; one to an American Indian group; three to the Middle 
East; two to Africa; and two to Latin America. All completed doc-
toral research, and ten contribute papers to this volume. The idea 
was to achieve, through coordinated research, greater consistency of 
method and a focus on more closely comparable levels of organiza-
tion than had been achieved in ethnographies published previously. 
Each study was to concentrate on "disputes between people of the 
same culture, disputes between people who for the most part know 
each other and who expect to interact in some fashion in the future 
regardless of the outcome of the dispute" (p. ix). On the assumption 
that there would be a range of dispute-handling procedures in any 
society (implying a degree of disputant choice), and that the avail-
8. An Analysis of Zapotec Law Cases (1964), 3 ETHNOLOGY 404 (1964); Ta/ea and Juqila: A 
Comparison ofZapotec Socia/ Organisation, 48 U. CAL. PUBLICATIONS IN AM. ARCHAEOLOGY 
& ETHNOLOGY 195 (1964); Styles of Court Procedure: To Make the Balance, in LAW IN CUL· 
TURE AND SOCIETY 69 (L. Nader ed. 1969). 
9. The Anthropological Study of Law, in 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (Special Publication) 3 
(1965); The Ethnography of Law: A Bibliographic Survey, 1 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 267 
(1966) (with K. Koch & B. Cox); On Studying the Ethnography of Law and Its Consequences, in 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 883 (J. Honigman ed. 1973) (with B. 
Yngvesson). 
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able procedures would differ from one society to another, Nader and 
her collaborators were "interested in understanding the conditions 
that defined the presence and use of specific dispute-resolving proce-
dures" (p. x). In doing so, they tried to go "beyond the static, equi-
librium model of structural-functionalist studies, toward a more 
dynamic, processual one" (pp. 4-5). Like Gulliver, they shift away 
from analysis of rules and structure toward the activities of living 
men. 
The .Disputing Process certainly reveals what a remarkable 
achievement the Berkeley Village Law Project has been. As one 
reads through the chapters, each devoted to a single field-study, it is 
impossible not to be impressed with this exercise in systematic inter-
societal comparison. The quality of the dispute data is good, and the 
processes are carefully related to each other and to an overall con-
text. Similarly, the concern with living men and women, and with 
the way in which these actors perceive and utilize the available pro-
cedures, brings the studies to life. All this is very good; and it is 
certainly true, as Nader and Todd claim in their introduction, that 
these advances have been achieved through a paradigmatic shift 
from a rule-centered approach to a processual one. The same shift, I 
have already noted, is noticeable in Gulliver's work and in many of 
the best legal ethnographies appearing over the past twenty years. 
But how far ahead has the claimed escape from a "rule-centered" to 
a "processual" paradigm really taken us? Does it enable us to ad-
dress the difficult questions concerning the relationship between rule 
and action, particularly those which center upon the relationship be-
tween behavioral change and changes in the normative repertoire? 
I shall argue here that the contemporary opposition between 
rule-centered and processual approaches, 10 which is now visible 
right across the social sciences, 11 represents a serious barrier to fur-
ther advance in the anthropology of law. Work within the rule-cen-
tered paradigm tends to underplay the transactional element in 
social life, suggesting too mechanical a relationship between rule and 
behavior. On the other hand, processual studies typically place too 
little emphasis on the operation of normative constraints. These two 
worlds, the domain of rules and the domain of action, have got to be 
related to each other more closely if either is to be fully understood. 
This problem is not confined to the small, relatively homogenous 
10. The origin of which may be traced at least as far back as Bronislaw Malinowski's 
writings in the 1920s. See, e.g., CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926). 
11. See A. GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE AND 
CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1979). 
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groupings with which· Gulliver and Nader have been principally 
concerned. But the acephalous character of such groupings and their 
lack of explicit rule-making and rule-changing procedures make it 
possible to construct a preliminary model of normative change 
which may be used as the starting point of discussion. The model 
suggested here may seem a simplistic one; and it is certainly not new, 
for it would have presented no surprises to Maine. But in the isola-
tion of the two paradigms to which I have referred, and in the strug-
gle for more sophisticated analysis, scholars have lost sight of some 
basic relationships. Although I retain a focus on disputes here, I do 
not wish to suggest any sharp distinction between instances of con-
flict and the regularities of everyday life. It simply is that a dispute 
offers the obseryer privileged access to rules; an occasion upon which 
the continual process of articulation and reformulation takes its 
clearest form. Rules spend most of their time in the heads of men 
and women; they are most likely to be brought out into the open and 
formulated in the context of dispute. 
Let us take as an example a small, relatively autonomous group 
like the Ligomba community that Gulliver describes in Neighbours 
and Networks. All the members are linked by ties of kinship or af-
finity, and all share knowledge of and access to a loosely constructed, 
not very clearly articulated, repertoire of rules relating to marriage, 
inheritance, land exploitation, and so on. It does not matter for our 
purposes where these rules come from; they are simply "there." We 
also assume, along with most anthropologists, that men and women 
formulate and pursue strategies in pursuit of their interests which 
take into account the likely actions and rule constructions of adja-
cent individuals and groups. To a given actor at any moment, some 
rules will seem advantageous, some irksome, and the actor will ar-
range the rules and articulate them in a manner which best fits his 
own objectives. Some of the time the actor will arrange his affairs so 
as to avoid confrontation with other people; but sometimes a clash 
will necessarily arise. Where this happens, third parties will become 
involved, aligning themselves with the respective sides. The respec-
tive positions and actions will be recounted, explained, perhaps ex-
plicitly justified by reference to rules; each side formulating the rules 
so as to place its own conduct in the most appropriate light. Eventu-
ally some agreement will be hammered out, after kinsmen and sup-
porters on both sides bring pressure to end the quarrel. But in the 
course of that quarrel rules will have been reformulated. These re-
formulations will remain in the minds of the participants, and the re-
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formulated rule will be consciously or subconsciously taken into ac-
count when future objectives are formulated and actions taken. 
Such a picture invites us to see interplay between rule and behav-
ior in the process of normative change. Thus, as life is experienced, 
changes in the content of the rule base take place which will them-
selves have consequences for future behavior as actors develop their 
strategies in the light of the reformulated rule. That subsequent ac-
tion will itself lead to further confrontation and further normative 
reformulation. The interplay is a continuing process, in which each 
sphere repeatedly reacts to the other. 12 
A picture of change very much along these lines is hinted at by 
Gulliver in the closing pages of .Disputes and Negotiations (pp. 274-
275). There he suggests that in addition to "perceiving a social rela-
tionship in terms of roles, rules and content, we can also perceive it 
as the ongoing, cumulative results of more or less constant negotia-
tion." Such negotiations and their outcomes "modify and direct the 
relationship." He then concludes: 
Indeed, it should prove possible to perceive a dialectic between the 
rules (and norms and values) and interactional problem-solving. On 
the one hand, there is no need to conceive of everything as up for 
grabs, plastic and almost without form at all; on the other hand, we 
should not ignore the inherent quality of plasticity nor the processes of 
problem solving and their continuing effects on the relationship. 
With this idea that particular social relationships involve recurrent 
negotiations that affect and in part determine and change their form 
and content, it is a logical extrapolation to the conception that negotia-
tions, both private and public, contribute to and perhaps largely deter-
mine a whole social order involving many persons and the ongoing 
organization of an interconnected set of social activities. 
Of course, it is a big jump which Gulliver suggests from the de-
velopment of a single relationship to the development of a whole 
social order. It is also a considerable leap from the small, relatively 
homogeneous groups that Gulliver has spent most of his time study-
ing to large, stratified, centralized societies like our own. Assuming 
we could accept such a picture of normative change in a small, 
acephalous grouping where disputants feel their way toward a settle-
ment with the advice and urging of third parties, has it any applica-
tion where some third party is in a position to hand down a decision 
- to state what the rules are and to formulate new ones? What 
about the society characterized by a high degree of di.ff erentiation 
12. I am not addressing here what some might regard as the more important question: 
what conditions bring about the most frequent and intense disputes likely to result in the more 
rapid reformulations of rules. 
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and specialization? Here many members of the group no longer un-
derstand and manipulate the rules themselves, and these skills have 
largely fallen into the hands of a specialized elite. Despite these dif-
ferences, it is certainly possible to view some areas of legal change 
which take place through Western courts in very much the terms 
Gulliver suggests: successive disputes involve reformulation of rules 
by the disputants' specialists, restatement by the adjudicator, and 
then a process through which the restatement is fed back again into 
action through channels provided by the specialists. The growth of 
certain aspects of revenue law through the successive responses of 
the legislature and taxpayers, for example, may be seen in this way. 
Perhaps the model is strained most if we try to apply it to a legal 
system operating in a colonial or post-colonial context, where legisla-
tive changes conceived at the center are designed to apply through-
out the diverse, formerly autonomous groupings that make up the 
new state. Nevertheless, the image of social life as negotiation is a 
powerful one, provided that we recognize and allow for the opera-
tion of normative constraints. 
* * * * 
Despite the extent to which processual approaches have domi-
nated recent work in the anthropology oflaw, studies which focus on 
the operation of a national legal system frequently remain within the 
rule-centered paradigm. That should not surprise us, perhaps, as 
this perspective matches the view of the specialists operating the sys-
tem: rules are "there" to constrain behavior. The very terminology 
used to discuss national legal systems reveals the degree to which 
this folk model has been allowed to dominate theory: studies con-
sider the "impact" and examine the "imposition" of law. The direc-
tion is all one way, from law toward behavior. The possibility of a 
two-way, interactive flow, along the lines suggested earlier in this 
review, is often ignored. 
A similar criticism can be made of work that postulates, and then 
examines, the "gap" between law and behavior. By definition such 
studies reject any mechanical fit between the two - and that is 
clearly a fruitful starting point. But insofar as the "gap" concept 
presupposes discontinuity and lack of connection between law and 
behavior, it is unhelpful. It was with such reservations that I ap-
proached Sandra Burman and Barbara Harrell-Bond's The Imposi-
tion of Law, a collection of essays based upon a conference held in 
April 1978 under the title of "The Social Consequences of Imposed 
Law." In fact there was no need to worry, for as the editors indicate 
in a terse, sensible introduction, the participants at the conference 
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seem to have realized almost from the outset that "imposed law" is 
an "elusive concept" (p. 2) of little use for analytical purposes. The 
phrase "imposed law" immediately conjures up notions of involun-
tary submission, oppressive governmental action, and injustice; but it 
does not help us to understand legislative processes or the ways in 
which people react to the laws enacted. 
The Imposition of Law is a catholic range of essays, some con-
cerned with modern industrialized countries and others with the 
third world, all touching upon aspects of legislation that seek social 
change. In several the phrase "imposed law" is loyally retained in 
the title or tactfully introduced in the first paragraph; but mercifully 
the concept does not inform much of the analysis. Many of the es-
says are good; two seem particularly important. In the first of these, 
Richard Abel examines how the introduction of Western-type settle-
ment institutions into tribal settings in Kenya affects litigation pat-
terns. Theorizing that "[s]ocial structure and institutional structure 
do interact to produce patterns of litigation" (p. 196), Abel links a 
sharp drop in civil litigation rates to the westernization of the local 
courts. He concludes: 
[P]eople choose whether or not to use the westernized courts, and the 
strategies they will employ if they do litigate. The exercise of these 
choices has very significant consequences. It determines the law that 
will be applied and thus influences the outcome of the dispute; in this 
sense people make law and decide cases. It affects the future relation-
ships of the parties and settings; people embedded in tribal social struc-
tures and therefore possessed of alternative forums for airing 
interpersonal disputes will increasingly shun modernized courts . . . . 
[Pp. 195-96.) 
There is, of course, a further sense in which "people make law" 
under circumstances like those described by Abel. When people fail 
to use westernized agencies, the corresponding strengthening and ex-
pansion of other forums for disputes in the tribal setting will "get 
back" to the legislator, and a further stage in the cycle of legislative 
action and litigant response is thus initiated. The approach Abel 
outlines seems extremely promising, particularly because the actors 
in the tribal setting are seen as reacting, innovative agents, rather 
than static recipients of rules as suggested by the concept of imposi-
tion. One point at which caution seems required concerns the rather 
stark distinction Abel draws between "tribal" and "modern" society. 
This contrast is probably adequate for Abel's purposes; but, as he is 
aware, the types of society which he labels "tribal" are quite varied, 
and the concept requires elaboration in other contexts. 
In a second important essay, Robert Kidder squarely faces the 
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theoretical difficulties of the concept of imposition. Kidder notes at 
the outset of his piece the diverse responses which members of indig-
enous groupings have offered to the legal regimes introduced by co-
lonial powers. These responses have varied from abject submission 
to daring and successful manipulation. Consequently, Kidder rejects 
"the static, hypodermic model of imposition" (p. 296), and replaces it 
with an "interactional model" that treats law as "an arena for the 
promotion of interests" (p. 291). There is here an echo of Gulliver's 
conception of social life as one of continuing negotiation, and the 
value of this approach lies in its attempt to establish a two-way rela-
tionship between legislative activity at the center and the behavior of 
living men and women on the periphery. 
Kidder replaces the concept of imposition with a distinction be-
tween "internal" and "external" law (pp. 296-97). A legal system is 
external when it represents "interests, institutions,' or values ex-
tending beyond the community within which conflict is occurring"; 
and the degree of externality may be measured by the layers of orga-
nizational complexity between lawmakers and the governed (p. 297). 
Kidder also asserts that "the more external the legal system, the 
more any conflict introduced into it or induced by it will take on 
meanings not originally relevant to the conflicting parties," and that 
"[e]xternal law offers alternatives to those whose interests conflict 
with indigenous norms" (p. 297). This last point is certainly true. It 
emphasizes the obvious but crucial fact that legislation does not ar-
rive in a vacuum; actors on the periphery necessarily have prior 
mental pictures of the normative constraints confronting them, and 
any new rules thrown into the pool will be added to and adjusted to 
those existing pictures. The legislator has no control over this pro-
cess; but his "success" may well depend upon his understanding of 
what existing pictures are like and his sensitivity to them. 
Kidder's concept of externality may well prove valuable; but it 
will require much more extensive development than is attempted in 
his essay. I would also question the extent to which externality can 
be measured solely in terms of institutional layers separating the 
lawmaker and the governed. From the perspective of the actor on 
the periphery, the degree of externality must in part be measured in 
terms of any analogy which may be developed between existing 
practices and the newly enacted provisions; this will itself depend to 
some extent upon the sensitivity of the legislator to what is going on 
and to how things are perceived on the periphery. This final point 
reveals the value which we must always attach to empirical investi-
gations of the kind which Gulliver has undertaken with such distinc-
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tion. From now on, one way forward lies in closer analysis of what 
is said and done in the context of disputes; 13 what people say when 
they quarrel offers one of the few available keys to a better under-
standing of the relationship between rule and action. 
13. See generally LANGUAGE AND POLITICS (J. O'Barr & W. O'Barr eds. 1976); POLITICAL 
LANGUAGE AND ORATORY IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (M. Bloch ed. 1975). 
